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AGE DISTINCTIONS AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS:
A CRITIQUE OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION
ACT OF 1975
LEONARD D CAIN*
In 1977, the United States Commission on Civil Rights issued The
Age Discrimination Study,' a report by a special committee charged
with translating the Age Discrimination Act of 19752 into an adminis-
trable set of rules and regulations.3 Analyzing a draft of the report at
that time, this author noted serious problems with the committee's pro-
posals. Read simply, the report was attractive; its recommendations
were to be cheered as progressive; and its methodology appeared to be
sound, even scientific. But read intently, and in theoretical context, the
same words became threatening; the report's recommendations ap-
proached absurdity; and its methodology seemed farcical.
The proposals would have divested society of age status differen-
tials. The demanded quota system would have produced more discrim-
ination than the drafters could have imagined. Title VII, OAA, Meals
on Wheels, and other programs would have been allocated by quotas.
If, for example, the watchdogs found that a higher percentage of those
over 75 than those 65-69 were served meals at home, then meals would
have been denied to some over 75 and some in the 65-69 age group
might have been advised to stay at home for a delivered lunch in order
to bring up the percentages.
The report showed no grasp of cohort effects. For example, the
Vietnam War may well have produced severe mental health strains
upon the young. But, according to the report, it appeared that mental
health services would have to be withdrawn from the young and re-
routed to older persons, regardless of the need or demand for services.
Another fundamental flaw in the report was that it forced a sharp
either/or approach to law. That is, it appeared that if Congress speci-
fied age discrimination, say, for Medicare, then absolute discrimination
* Professor of Sociology and Urban Studies, Portland State University Institute on Aging,
Portland, Oregon; B.A., M.A., Texas Christian University; Ph.D., University of Texas, Austin.
1. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY (PART I)
(1977).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
3. The Age Discrimination Act of 1975 regulations are codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 90.1-90.62
(1980).
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was to be implemented; if Congress, in its wisdom, funded a program
without legitimizing age discrimination, then absolute quotas would
prevail. Becoming enslaved by a demographer's computer printout
hardly seemed to be progress. To deny, as this report seemed to, the
relevance of both age and cohort differences through the rigid applica-
tion of a formula is to promote both injustice and inefficiency.
Although the final regulations implementing the Age Discrimina-
tion Act of 1975 have since been issued by the United States Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, this author's disquiet persists.
Evidence from history, from anthropology, and from numerous socio-
logical and descriptive observations makes it clear that a functional
prerequisite for every society is the confrontation of the facts of aging
of its members and age differentials among its members, and the insti-
tutionalizing of means to accommodate those facts. Children and
adults have been given different assignments, different rights, and dif-
ferent privileges.
In commenting on the functions of age distinctions in the context
of the legal system, there are three major issues which must be ad-
dressed. The first issue is that of age status termini. When does life
begin? When does it end? When does infancy end and adulthood be-
gin? These simple questions are complicated by the fact that an indi-
vidual may not move into a new age status all at one time. This author
has called this phenomenon age status asynchronization.4 Possibly the
most publicized example of this phenomenon is the "old enough to
fight, old enough to vote" campaign slogan of a generation ago.
This issue remains an important and timely one, as any number of
examples will show. For instance, a congressional committee recently
conducted hearings on a proposed constitutional amendment which
would declare that life, with all the protections bestowed by law upon
the living, begins at the time of conception. In recent years the United
States Supreme Court has adopted the concept of trimesters during
pregnancy to distinguish legalized abortion from murder.5 Several
years ago, a 15-year-old youth was declared to have the same criminal
due process rights as an adult citizen.6 But issues of responsibilities to
parallel the rights of adults remain unclarified.
One of the thorniest age termini problems of the 1980s relates to
the timing of old age. With the abolition or postponement of
4. Cain, Life Course and Social Structure, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY (R. Faris
ed. 1964).
5. See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1976).
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mandatory retirement, an older worker is protected as an adult under
the law. Yet, as under Medicare, older persons are provided with pro-
tections and resources not available to other adults.
The second issue relates to age determination. There are at least
three widely recognized definitions of age--chronological, functional,
and social. The use of chronological age to determine status differenti-
ation between children and adults can be traced to antiquity. In the
past few decades, however, chronological age has also been used to dis-
tinguish between adulthood and old age. The legal terminus for adult-
hood has been established, and "old age" has become a statistical
category, both through use of chronological age. Yet many studies
have revealed vast variations in rates of aging, retention of skills, abil-
ity to learn and adapt in later years, and in retention of stamina in old
age. All these are measures of functional age. Thus, at the same time
that chronological age has increasingly become a determinant for as-
signment to the old age status, researchers confirm its inadequacy as an
appropriate method for determining old age. The postponing of
mandatory retirement is an example of how the conjoining of chrono-
logical age and functional age creates problems for policymakers.
With regard to social age, an example of its use is seniority rights
for workers. In recent years this concept has been undergoing various
tests in the courts, especially by those who advocate affirmative action
strategies for minority groups.
A fourth definition of age, less widely known, but perhaps most
important, is that of counting backward from projected death rather
than counting forward from birth (chronological age):
[Tihe further an individual moves from the year of his birth, the less
significant is that fact for the purposes of gauging functional capac-
ity. A major breakthrough is likely to come as indicators of the
length of time until death become perfected. We know a bit about
the significance of longevity of parents; we know that cigarette smok-
ing shortens life; we predict how long a cancer patient is likely to
live. The practice of retiring everyone at an age counting from birth
results in some workers receiving only a few months return from
many years of contribution to pension funds; others will receive pay-
ments for decades. If age could be counted backward from death,
rather than forward from birth, more equitable opportunity to re-
ceive return on pension investments could be accomplished, housing
and health service planning could be improved, and a larger percent-
age of the elderly could have the option of a few years of leisure at
the end of their lives.7
7. Cain, Aging and the Law, in HANDBOOK OF AGING AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1976).
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The concept has also been suggested by Ryder, who wrote:
We measure age in terms of the number of years elapsed since
birth. This seems to be a useful, meaningful index of the stages of
development from birth to maturity. Beyond maturity, however,
such an index becomes progressively less useful. . . . To the extent
that our concern with age is what it signifies about the degree of dete-
rioration and dependence, it would seem sensible to consider the
measurement of age not in terms of years elapsed since birth (chron-
ological age) but rather in terms of the number of years remaining
until death.
* * 'Such a suggestion is inapplicable in the individual
case. . . . We propose that some arbitrary length of time, such as 10
years, be selected and that we determine at what age the expectation
of life is 10 years, that age to be considered the point of entry into old
age.8
Ironically, what Ryder says is "inapplicable in the individual case"
is precisely what the law is developing. Thus, the court reasoned in
Weeks v. Alonzo Cothron, Inc. :9
Decedent was age 50 at the time of death in August, 1968 ...
His life expectancy under standard tables was 23 years. Plaintiff's
expert computed the future value of decedent's earnings on an expec-
tancy of his working 15 years to age 65, assuming that he was in good
physical condition and would be able to perform heavy manual work
until age 65. . . . The trial court concluded:
In fact, there is a very serious question as to whether or not he
would have lived to age 65 with his heart condition and drinking
problem. The greater weight of the credible evidence indicates,
and I so find, that the deceased would not have worked past age
60, or a total of ten years, if, in fact, he lived that long from the
date of his death ...
Bearing in mind decedent's family history, his medical history, and
the type of work he did, we are unable to say that the trial court erred
in concluding that his work expectancy would not exceed 10 years.1 0
The concept of "counting backward" is yet to be systematically
developed in jurisprudence; it is yet to be systematically utilized in leg-
islation; and it is yet to be identified and adopted in administration.
However, the concept is clearly present in policy recommendations.
For example, a policy change under consideration at present is the age
of eligibility for Social Security benefits. A report recently released by
the President's Commission on Pension Policy cautiously approached
the "counting backward" issue:
The Commission believes that the age of normal retirement
8. Ryder, Notes on Stationary Populations, 41 POPULATION INDEX 3, 16 (1975).
9. 493 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1975).
10. Id at 543-44.
CRITIQUE OF THE ADA
should change as average life expectancy in the population changes,
rather than being set at an age chosen arbitrarily. However it ap-
pears that, over time, implementing a formula to achieve such an
outcome may be impracticable. An increase to age 68, as suggested
by many groups, reflects increases in life expectancy since the begin-
ning of social security and thus reflects changes that have already
occurred in the proportion of adult life that is being spent in retire-
ment. . . . Therefore, because of the need to plan for the future re-
tirement age, that age could be reevaluated in the future as life
expectancies change. P
It is likely that "counting backward" will become one of the more
controversial and vital issues in aging and the law during the final de-
cades of this century.
The third issue may be identified as inter-status equal-
ity/inequality versus inter-status equity/inequity. Specifically, how is
the "equal protection of the laws" to be applied to the several stages of
the life course? It can be argued that current national policy centers
upon providing justice by accepting the elderly as unequals and by en-
acting laws which are designed to overcome the negative consequences
of that inequality. Thus, a separate legal status for the elderly takes
form.
12
This issue is of prime concern for both theoretical and humane
reasons. Justice requires consideration of the equity rather than the
equality issue. In recent years the gerontological movement especially
has become ensnared by advocating both equality and equity simulta-
neously. The prime example is the move to abolish mandatory retire-
ment practices and thus extend adult rights to those who have been
identified in law as old, when at the same time there are continuing
moves to expand the special rights of those very same people on the
grounds that they are old and thereby different from adults in their
needs and in their rights to have those needs met.
CONCLUSION
Because of these and other complicated issues, Congress was ill-
informed when it enacted the Age Discrimination Act of 1975. A myr-
iad of problems have already flowed, and many more are likely to flow,
from this poorly conceived law.
The Civil Rights Commission report was beset with the inade-
quacy of a narrow definition of equality, rather than a more appropri-
11. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, AN INTERIM REPORT 47 (1980).
12. See Cain, Political Factors in the Emerging Legal Status of the Elderly, 415 ANNALS OF
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 70 (1974).
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ate concern for equity among age categories. The current regulations
issued by the Department of Health and Human Services to implement
the Act continue to be plagued by this inadequacy. 13
Those who pressed most strongly for the Act assumed that its
thrust would be exclusively, or at least primarily, directed toward pro-
tection of the elderly; but the implementation of the Act is, instead,
properly directed toward all age categories. Thus, special privileges are
likely to be exposed, and the justice sought for the elderly through the
principle of equity may be in peril.
Social scientists, practitioners, policymakers, and consumers each
have a responsibility to examine the Act and the implications inherent
in its enactment. Social scientists need to explore the concepts relevant
to age status differentials. Practitioners need to take to heart the dictate
that they may be unwittingly adding to age discrimination. Policymak-
ers need to delay enforcement of the current Act until fuller informa-
tion is available. Elderly consumers need to question the real costs and
benefits which will accrue to them under the law. What the Age Dis-
crimination Act needs is a thorough testing of its premises and its trans-
lation in the light of both descriptive evidence of age status systems and
life course theory. Either an outright rescinding of the ill-fated law, or
drastic amendment, will surely follow.
13. 45 C.F.R. §§ 90.1-90.62 (1980).
